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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, the Persons Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute
undertook a revision of Book I, of Persons, of the Louisiana Civil Code. As a
result, in 1991, a package of bills was introduced in the House of Representatives
upon recommendation of the Law Institute through its Council, proposing
revisions of the law of divorce, spousal support, child custody, child support,
claims for contributions to a spouse's education, incidental proceedings in an
action for nullity, and a "housekeeping" revision of various statutory provisions
occasioned by the proposed changes. All, with the exception of the bill
concerning spousal support, have been enacted into law.' The changes in child
custody and in child support are contained in Act 261 of 2993, effective January
1, 1994. The purpose of this article is to review these revisions.
II. CUSTODY
Since time immemorial, the state, through its representatives, has been called
upon to decide custody disputes between two or more persons, each of whom
seeks custody of a child. Laws have historically stated preferences as between
the mother and the father.2 Originally, in Louisiana the provisional custody
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1. The law of divorce was revised by 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 2 (effective January 1, 1991),
as amended by 1991 La. Acts No. 367, § 1 (effective September 6, 1991). The law of claims for
contributions to a spouse's education was revised by 1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 2 (effective January
1, 1991), as amended by 1991 La. Acts No. 367, § 1 (effective September 6, 1991). The law of
incidental proceedings in an action of nullity was revised by 1993 La. Acts No. 108, § 1 (effective
January 1, 1994). "Housekeeping" revisions were included in 1990 La. Acts No. 1009 (effective
January 1, 1991). The law of custody and child support was revised by 1993 La. Acts No. 261
(effective January 1, 1994). The spousal support proposal, reintroduced as H.R. 963 (1993), was
deferred by the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure. It has been revised and approved
by the Council of the Law Institute, and will be reintroduced at a future session of the Legislature.
2. See Lois E. Hawkins, Joint Custody in Louisiana, 43 La. L. Rev. 85 (1982), for an
interesting and detailed review of the history of child custody determinations and state policies
preferring one parent or the other.
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during the pendency of the suit was awarded to the father unless there were
strong reasons to deprive him of it.3  In 1888, the statutory preference was
granted to the mother.4 In 1979, Louisiana Civil Code article 146 was amended
to provide that provisional custody should be granted to the husband or the wife,
in accordance with the best interest of the child.5 This amendment introduced
the "best interest of the child" concept as the statutory test for a provisional
custody award. No preference between the husband or wife was stated. In spite
of this, courts continued to give preference to the mother under the maternal
preference rule and the tender years doctrine.' In 1981, the article was again
amended to provide for a provisional award of joint custody, but only if both
husband and wife agreed to joint custody and the court deemed it to be in the
best interest of the child.7 Joint custody was defined as meaning that the
husband and wife shared the physical custody of the child and enjoyed the
natural cotutorship of the child.8 No other details were provided, except that if
3. La. Civ. Code art. 146 (1870) provided:
If there are children of the marriage, whose provisional keeping is claimed by both
husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall be granted to the
husband, whether plaintiff or defendant, unless there should be strong reasons to deprive
him of it, either in whole or in part, the decision whereof is left to the discretion of the
judge.
4. 1888 La. Acts No. 124 amended La. Civ. Code art. 146 (1870) to read:
If there are children of the marriage, whose provisional keeping is claimed by both
husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall be granted to the
wife, whether plaintiff or defendant; unless there should be strong reasons to deprive her
of it, either in whole or in part, the decision whereof is left to the discretion of the judge.
5. 1979 La. Acts No. 718, § 1 amended La. Civ. Code art. 146 (1870) to read:
If there are children of the marriage, whose provisional keeping is claimed by both
husband and wife, the suit being yet pending and undecided, it shall be granted to the
husband or the wife, in accordance with the best interest of the children. In all cases, the
court shall inquire into the fitness of both the mother and the father and shall award
custody to the parent the court finds will in all respects be in accordance with the best
interest of the child or children. Such custody hearing may be held in private chambers
of the judge.
6. Fulco v. Fulco, 259 La. 1122, 254 So. 2d 603 (1971); Messner v. Messner, 240 La. 252,
122 So. 2d 90 (1960); Sampognaro v. Sampognaro, 215 La. 631, 41 So. 2d 456 (1949); Ard v. Ard,
210 La. 869, 28 So. 2d 461 (1946); Willis v. Willis, 209 La. 205, 24 So. 2d 378 (1945); Black v.
Black, 205 La. 861, 18 So. 2d 321 (1944); Tullier v. Tullier, 140 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1962). Black also contains a lengthy list of supporting cases. Black, 205 La. at 867, 18 So. 2d at
323. Ard acknowledged the general rule of maternal preference; however, the court granted custody
to the father based on the factual circumstances of the case. Ard, 210 La. at 871-73, 28 So. 2d at
462.
7. 1981 La. Acts No. 283, § I added to La. Civ. Code art. 146 (1870) the following language:
A. [I]f both husband and wife agree to joint custody and the court deems it in the best
interest of the children, the court may award joint custody....
B. An award of joint custody shall be made only when the husband and wife are
domiciled in the State of Louisiana. If either parent changes his or her domicile to
another state, the other may petition for sole custody.
8. La. Civ. Code art. 146(B) (1870), as amended by 1981 La. Acts No. 283, § 1.
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either parent removed his domicile to another state, the other could petition the
court for sole custody.9 In 1982, a non-consensual provisional joint custody act
was adopted.'0 Although amended a number of times," it provided the
framework for provisional joint custody until the enactment of Act 261, which
comprehensively amended the child custody provisions.
Until 1977, Louisiana Civil Code article 157 provided that, in the case of
separation and divorce, custody should be granted to the party who obtained the
separation or the divorce unless the judge should, for the greater advantage of the
child, order that custody be granted to the other party. However, the jurispru-
dence required application of the maternal preference rule and the tender years
doctrine to prefer the mother in awarding permanent custody,' 2 as it did in case
of provisional custody. Thereafter, amendments to Article 157 were made
paralleling those made to Article 146, establishing joint custody as the preferred
custody arrangement both in provisional custody and in permanent custody. 3
A basic policy decision to strengthen the joint custody preference is reflected in
the 1993 amendments to the existing child custody statutory provisions.
The best interest of the child was the controlling criterion in custody and
visitation awards in prior Article 131 . It provided: "There shall be a
rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor child."
The article represented a legislative determination that the best interest of the
child was served by providing a descending order of preference in awarding
custody: (1) to both parents jointly," (2) to either parent, 6 (3) to the person
in whose home the child has been living in a wholesome and stable environ-
ment, 7 or (4) to any other person deemed by the court to be suitable and able
9. Id.
10. 1982 La. Acts No. 307, § 1 (effective January 1, 1983).
11. 1989 La. Acts No. 188, § 1; 1986 La. Acts No. 950, § 1; 1984 La. Acts No. 786, § 1; 1984
La. Acts No. 133, § 1; 1983 La. Acts No. 695, § 1. La. Civ. Code art. 146 (1870) was redesignated
as La. Civ. Code art. 131 pursuant to 1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, §
10.
12. See the cases cited supra note 6.
13. Former La. Civ. Code art. 157 (1870), as amended by 1977 La. Acts No. 448, §1, provided
in part: "In all cases of separation and divorce, permanent custody of the child or children shall be
granted to the husband or the wife, in accordance with the best interest of the child or children."
For an excellent review of the jurisprudential history of the best interest principle, the maternal
preference presumption, and the effect of 1977 La. Acts No. 448 and the joint custody law of 1982
(1982 La. Acts No. 307) on these principles, see Bergeron v. Bergeron, 492 So. 2d 1193 (La. 1986).
14. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
15. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(1) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
16. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(2) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
17. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(3) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
1994]
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to provide an adequate and stable environment. 8 The presumption in favor of
joint custody could be rebutted by a showing, after consideration of evidence
introduced with respect to twelve enumerated factors,' 9 that joint custody was
not in the best interest of the child.' The burden of proving joint custody
would not be in a child's best interest was placed upon the parent requesting sole
custody.2'
Act 261 retains the best interest of the child as the overriding test to be
applied in all child custody determinations.22 However, one change has been
made in the descending order of preferred custodial arrangements. Additionally,
18. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(4) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
19. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2)(a)-(Y) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131
by 1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La- Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided:
(2) The presumption in favor of joint custody may be rebutted by a showing that it is not
in the best interest of the child, after consideration of evidence introduced with respect to
all of the following factors:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the parties involved
and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to give the child love,
affection, and guidance and to continue the education and raising of the child in his
religion or creed, if any.
(c) The capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
(d) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment, and
the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(e) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or
homes.
(f) The moral fitness of the parties involved.
(g) The mental and physical health of the parties involved.
(h) The home, school, and community record of the child.
(i) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
sufficient age to express a preference.
0) The willingness and ability of each of the parents to facilitate and encourage a
close and continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent.
(k) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
(/) Any other factor considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute. However, the classification of persons according to race is neither
relevant nor permissible.
20. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
21. Owen v. Gallien, 477 So. 2d 1240 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Lake v. Robertson, 452 So. 2d
376 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
22. La. Civ. Code art. 131 provides: "In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court shall
award custody of a child in accordance with the best interest of the child." La. Civ. Code art. 131
cmt. (a) affirms that the article "retains the best interest of the child as the overriding test to be
applied in all child custody determinations."
The classification of custody as provisional and permanent has been abolished. The new custody
rules apply equally to initial awards of custody and modifications of custody, both during the
pendency of a divorce action and thereafter.
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the preference of joint custody as being the custodial arrangement that is in the
best interest of the child, absent an agreement between the parents designating
the person who is to have custody, has been substantially strengthened.
Prior Article 131 created a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the
best interest of a child, but permitted the parents to agree to an award of custody
to one parent. 23 The article did not state whether the parents had the unquali-
fied right to name one of them as custodian or whether this parental right was
subject to a best interest of the child analysis or to the rebuttable presumption in
favor of joint custody.
In the prior act, the best interest of the child test and the order of preference
established were substantive statutory provisions.24 However, the act also
provided a rebuttable legal presumption that joint custody was in the best interest
of a child.2s A presumption is a consequence the law or the court attaches to
a known fact for the purpose of establishing the existence of another and
unknown fact.2s A presumption established by law is a dispensation of the need
to furnish proof of the unknown fact.2 In a custody inquiry, the known fact
is joint custody. The unknown fact is whether joint custody is in the best interest
of a child. The law presumes it is. The application of this legal presumption,
in the absence of contrary evidence, establishes that joint custody is in the best
interest of the child. Other proof of the unknown fact is not required.2 g Since
the presumption in former Louisiana Civil Code article 131(C) was rebuttable,
it could be controverted 29 in the manner provided in former Louisiana Civil
23. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided: "There shall be a rebuttable
presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor child. (1) However, the parents may
agree to an award of custody to one parent."
24. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(1)-(3) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by
1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8. and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
25. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C) (1870). redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10. A presumption established by law is
referred to as a legal presumption; one not so established is referred to as a simple or factual
presumption. A presumption is established by law when it is attached to certain acts or facts by
special legislative language. A presumption not established by law is left to the discretion of the
court. La. Civ. Code art. 1852. For a scholarly discussion of these principles, see I Saul Litvinoff.
Obligations § 12.121-126, at 410-17, in 5 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1992).
26. La. Civ. Code art. 1849. Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (La. 1984), stated: "A
presumption does not have any probative value, but merely provides the fact-finder with a conclusion
in the absence of proof to the contrary.... [Tlhe presumption only provides the judge with a first
choice, which choice must be rejected in the face of evidence which tends to disprove the
conclusion."
27. La. Civ. Code art. 1850 provides: "A party whose interest is favored by a presumption
established by law need not offer other proof." See Litvinoff, supra note 25, § 12.123, at 413.
28. La. Civ. Code art. 1850; Succession of Manning, 107 La. 456, 31 So. 862 (1902); Vining
v. Beatty, 161 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964).
29. La. Civ. Code art. 1851 provides: "Legal presumptions are rebuttable or conclusive. A
rebuttable legal presumption is established in the interest of private parties and may be controverted.
A conclusive legal presumption is established for reasons of public policy and may not be controvert-
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Code article 131(C)(2)(a)-(/). 0  The Legislature mandated both that the
controlling criterion for custodial awards was the best interest of the child and
that the child's interest was protected in the statutory order of preference of
custodial arrangements, the first of which, absent a contrary parental agreement,
was joint custody." No legal presumption in favor of joint custody was
necessary.
This rebuttable presumption in favor of joint custody contained in the prior
law has been suppressed. In its place is the "best interest of the child" test
32
with a mandatory descending order of types of custodial arrangements33 that
may be ordered by the court. This listing reflects the legislative determination
as to which alternate type of custody arrangement is in the best interest of the
child in each of the circumstances enumerated.
The new legislation mandates that if the parents agree as to who will have
custody, the court "shall award custody" in accordance with the parents'
agreement unless the best interest of the child requires a different award.' This
agreement may be one in which the parents have joint custody, one in which one
parent has sole custody, or one in which a third party has custody. 35 During
the marriage, the decisions of the parents with respect to their children, absent
serious harmful effects to the children, are not reviewable by the state.' This
provision reflects the view that, in the marriage-terminating and post-marriage
periods, the agreement of the parents as to custody, absent harm to the child,
should continue to be respected.
ed." See also Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374, 1379 (La. 1984).
30. See supra note 19.
31. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
32. La. Civ. Code art. 131 states in part: "In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court
shall award custody of a child in accordance with the best interest of the child."
33. La. Civ. Code art. 132 states:
If the parents agree who is to have custody, the court shall award custody in accordance
with their agreement unless the best interest of the child requires a different award.
In the absence of agreement, or if the agreement is not in the best interest of the child,
the court shall award custody to the parents jointly, however, if custody in one parent is
shown by clear and convincing evidence to serve the best interest of the child, the court
shall award custody to that parent.
La. Civ. Code art. 133 states:
If an award of joint custody or of sole custody to either parent would result in
substantial harm to the child, the court shall award custody to another person with whom
the child has been living in a wholesome and stable environment, or otherwise to any
other person able to provide an adequate and stable environment.
34. The first paragraph of La. Civ. Code art. 132 provides: "If the parents agree who is to have
custody, the court shall award custody in accordance with their agreement unless the best interest of
the.child requires a different award."
35. La. Civ. Code art. 132 cmt. (b). The right of the parents to designate the custodian of their
children is broader than that conferred in prior Civil Code art. 131(C)(1), which limited the parents
to an agreement of an award of custody "to one parent."
36. See In re State ex rel. Thoman, 253 La. 496, 218 So. 2d 571 (1969).
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If the parents do not agree as to who is to have custody, or if their
agreement is found not to be in the best interest of the child, the court "shall
award custody to the parents jointly."37  No longer is joint custody simply
presumed to be in the best interest of the child; it is mandated absent an
appropriate parental agreement for another custodial arrangement.
Absent agreement between the parents, custody in one parent may be granted
only if it is shown "by clear and convincing evidence" that this type of custody
will serve the best interest of the child."
Two changes in the burden of proof are evident in the revision. Prior
Article 131 established a presumption in favor of joint custody39 and the
jurisprudence placed the burden of proof that joint custody would not be in the
child's best interest on the party seeking sole custody.' Normally in Louisiana,
the burden of proof is satisfied by adducing a reasonable preponderance of the
evidence,4 i.e., when the entirety of the evidence establishes the fact sought to
be proved is more probable than not.42 A substantially higher burden is now
placed on the parent seeking sole custody-that of "clear and convincing
evidence. 4 3 This standard of proof requires more than a preponderance of the
evidence but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.44 Under this standard, the
existence of a disputed fact must be "highly probable," that is, much more
probable than its non-existence. 5
37. See the second paragraph of La. Civ. Code art. 132, supra note 33.
38. La. Civ. Code art. 132, supra note 33.
39. See supra note 23.
40. Owen v. Gallien, 477 So. 2d 1240 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Lake v. Robertson, 452 So. 2d
376 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984).
41. Lasha v. Olin Corp., 625 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1993); Miller v. Leonard, 588 So. 2d 79 (La.
1991); Meyer v. State, 312 So. 2d 289 (La. 1975).
42. Lasha, 625 So. 2d at 1005; Miller, 588 So. 2d at 81.
43. La. Civ. Code art. 132. This conforms to the mandate of Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982), that due process requires proof at least by clear and convincing measure
before the fundamental rights of parents can be extinguished. See the comment to La. Ch. Code art.
1035.
44. Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 2d 1161, 1165 (La. 1984); Succession of Dowling, 633 So.
2d 846, 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994).
45. Lyons, 452 So. 2d at 1165; Dowling, 633 So. 2d at 855. Examples of this burden of proof
are found in La. Ch. Code art. 1035 (involuntary termination of parental rights), La. Civ. Code art.
209(B) (proof of filiation to deceased parent), La. Civ. Code art. 1482 (proof that donor lacked
capacity at time donor made a donation inter vivos or executed a testament), La. Civ. Code art. 1483
(challenge of a donation because of fraud, duress, or undue influence), and a similar jurisprudentially
developed burden of proof necessary to overcome the presumption that all things in the possession
of a spouse during the existence of the legal regime are presumed to be community. See Prince v.
Hopson, 230 La. 575, 89 So. 2d 128 (1956); Terry v. Terry, 565 So. 2d 997 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990);
Allbritton v. Allbritton, 561 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writs denied, 565 So. 2d 445, 454 (1990);
Allen y. Allen, 539 So. 2d 820 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 541 So. 2d 840 (1989); Norwood v.
Norwood, 519 So. 2d 338 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 521 So. 2d 1169 (1988); Lee v. Manning,
505 So. 2d 902 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987); Succession of McVay v. McVay, 476 So. 2d 1070 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1985); Succession of Adger, 457 So. 2d 146 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Smith v. Smith, 311
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Also, the focus of the inquiry is shifted. Under prior Article" 131, the focus
was on the joint custody arrangement and whether it was in the child's best
interest.4 The inquiry was directed toward the quality of the relationship
existing between the parents with respect to the rearing of the child. With this
focus on the effect of joint custody on the child, most of the cases emphasized
that, for joint custody to work, there must be a willingness and ability on the part
of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing parent-child
relationship between the child and the other parent.47  When the evidence
showed the parents could not or would not work together to the extent required
in a joint custody arrangement, sole custody was mandated. 8 Unfortunately,
the inquiry was frequently directed at the parents and their relationship, not the
welfare of the child.
Under present Article 132, the focus of the inquiry is not on the joint
custody arrangement; it is on sole custody in a particular parent. It must be
shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that custody in that parent will serve
the best interest of the child.49 The question changes from why joint custody
is not in the best interest of the child to why sole custody in a particular parent
is in the best interest of the child. Although these issues may overlap, the
burden on the parent seeking sole custody is to demonstrate that the granting of
custody to that parent alone will be in the best interest of the child.50
The provisions regulating an award of custody to a third person, rather than
to one or both parents, have been changed in several respects. Prior Article 131
required a dual finding that an award of custody to a parent or to both parents
would be "detrimental" to the child and that the award to a non-parent was
So. 2d 514 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 313 So. 2d 840 (1975); Succession of Broussard, 306 So.
2d 399 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975). Although these cases variously use the descriptive words "clear,"
"positive," "strict," "heavy," and "legally certain," the standard appears to approximate a "clear and
convincing" standard. See Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes § 4.8, at
134-136, in 16 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1989), for a discussion of this jurisprudence. See also
La. Civ. Code art. 1482 cmts. (a)-(c).
46. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided: "The presumption in favor
of joint custody may be rebutted by a showing that it is not in the best interest of the child."
(emphasis added).
47. Draper v. Draper, 556 So. 2d 210 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1990); Cahanin v. Cahanin, 533 So.
2d 27 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 534 So. 2d 433 (1988); Dominick v. Dominick, 470 So. 2d
314 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 474 So. 2d 948 (1985).
48. Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1984); Yelverton v. Yelverton, 621 So. 2d 36 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1993).
49. La. Civ. Code art. 132 provides that "if custody in one parent is shown by clear and
convincing evidence to serve the best interest of the child, the court shall award custody to that
parent." (emphasis added).
50. The inquiry shifts from a negative to a positive one, from why joint custody to both parents
is not in the child's best interest to why sole custody in a particular parent is in the child's best
interest.
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required to serve the best interest of the child.5' The test in present Article 133
is whether a parental award of custody would result in "substantial harm" to the
child.5 2 The new test recognizes the primacy of a parent's right to custody as
against any nonparent." In this situation, the focus is on the parent or parents
and the harmful effect on the child of a parental custody award, because of the
parental primacy concept firmly rooted in the prior statutes and jurisprudence.s
Arguably, the elimination of the dual test and the substitution of a single
"substantial harm" test effects a substantive change in the test. "Substantial harm
to the child" is a more stringent evidentiary burden than "detrimental to the
child."55 The new language was adopted from the jurisprudence as an efficient
means of giving effect to a parent's paramount right to custody as against any
nonparent.56
One of the deficiencies of prior Article 131 was that it contained no rules
for decision-making by the parents awarded joint custody. It did provide that a
plan for implementation of the custody order must allocate the legal authority,
privileges, and responsibilities of the parents, 57 and that, unless allocated,
apportioned, or decreed in the implementation plan, the parents must confer with
one another in the exercise of decision-making rights, responsibilities, and
authority5 8 Unless the implementation plan specified the decision-making
51. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(B) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided:
Before the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other than
a parent without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding that an award of
custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a nonparent is
required to serve the best interest of the child.
For good discussions of this dual test, see Bolding v. Bolding, 532 So. 2d 1199 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1988); Boyett v. Boyett, 448 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
52. La. Civ. Code art. 133 provides:
If an award of joint custody or of sole custody to either parent would result in
substantial harm to the child, the court shall award custody to another person with whom
the child has been living in a wholesome and stable environment, or otherwise to any
other person able to provide an adequate and stable environment.
53. La. Civ. Code art. 133 cmt. (b). The primacy of a parent's right to custody was also recog-
nized in prior legislation. See Bolding v. Bolding, 532 So. 2d 1199 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Boyett
v. Boyett, 448 So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
54. See Bolding v. Bolding, 532 So. 2d 1199 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Boyett v. Boyett, 448
So. 2d 819 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984).
55. La. Civ. Code art. 133 cmt. (a) states that the previous provisions are reproduced without
substantial change, and cmt. (b) states that the "substantial harm" proof requirement represents a
change in the terminology of the test for divestiture of parental custody. However, that comment
acknowledges that the language of the revision may be interpreted as changing significantly the terms
of the relevant test, making it more stringent.
56. La. Civ. Code art. 133 cmt. (b).
57. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(1) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
58. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(D) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
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authority of each parent, the only statutory obligation imposed upon the parents
was to confer with each other about these matters. If the parents disagreed after
conferring, no mechanism was provided to resolve the dispute.
Some of the responsibility for the lack of cooperation between divorcing or
divorced parents in a joint custody arrangement can be attributed to this
deficiency in the prior joint custody statute. The prior act presupposed a
willingness of the parents to cooperate with each other for the benefit of the
child. In many cases, this is not a realistic expectation.59 Additionally, a parent
could sabotage a joint custody award by refusing to cooperate and might be
motivated to do so if he believed he would be awarded sole custody if the court
determined joint custody would not work. The new act remedies this. It
provides that the domiciliary parent has the authority to make all decisions
affecting the child unless an implementation order otherwise provides.' Thus,
a non-domiciliary parent who does not desire the domiciliary parent to have full
decision-making authority must have any restrictions on that authority incorporat-
ed into the implementation order. All major decisions made by the domiciliary
parent concerning the child are subject to judicial review upon motion by the
non-domiciliary parent.6' In this judicial review, it is presumed all major
59. See Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1984); Yelverton v. Yelverton, 621 So. 2d 36
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
60. La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3) (Supp. 1994) provides: "The domiciliary parent shall have authority
to make all decisions affecting the child unless an implementation order provides otherwise." This
grant of authority to make all decisions affecting the child unless an implementation order provides
otherwise presents a dichotomy between La. Civ. Code art. 250 and La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3). Article
250 provides that, if the parents are awarded joint custody of a child, the cotutorship of the minor
child shall belong to both parents with equal authority, privileges, and responsibilities, unless
modified by order of the court or by an agreement of the parents, approved by the court awarding
joint custody. Article 250 was not amended by 1993 La. Acts No. 261.
A custody award and tutorship create different legal relationships. A custody award does not
include appointment of a tutor, nor does it institute a regime of tutorship. Griffith v. Roy, 263 La.
712, 269 So. 2d 217 (1972).
If one parent has been named the domiciliary parent without any limitations on his decision
making authority, and it becomes necessary to institute tutorship proceedings in order to judicially
assert a claim on behalf of the minor, or for other reasons, the parents would be appointed cotutors
with equal authority, privileges, and responsibilities, unless modified by one of the specified methods,
presumably either at the time of the awarding of joint custody or at the time of appointment of a
tutor. Tutors have the custody of and care for the person of the minor. La. Code Civ. P. art. 4261.
Therefore, a domiciliary parent with unrestricted decision making authority might seek restrictions
on the other parent's authority or seek to be appointed the sole tutor, if the occasion for tutorship
arises.
61. La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3) (Supp. 1994).
The domiciliary parent shall have authority to make all decisions affecting the child
unless an implementation order provides otherwise. All major decisions made by the
domiciliary parent concerning the child shall be subject to review by the court upon
motion of the other parent. It shall be presumed that all major decisions made by the
domiciliary parent are in the best interest of the child.
[Vol. 55
CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT LEGISLATION
decisions made by the domiciliary parent are in the best interest of the child.62
Therefore, the burden of proving they are in fact not in the best interest of the
child is placed on the non-domiciliary parent who opposes the decision. Non-
major decisions are not subject to judicial review. Thus, the act strengthens the
position of the domiciliary parent and permits him to make all of the decisions
concerning the child, unless limited by the implementation order, with only major
decisions being subject to judicial review. Although the act does not define the
nature of a major decision, such decisions normally include decisions concerning
major surgery or medical treatment, elective surgery, and schools attended,63 but
not the day-to-day decisions involved in rearing a child, e.g., bedtimes, curfews,
household chores, and the like. The increase in the burden of proof, the shift in
the focus of the inquiry, and the changes made in the decision-making rules
combine to strengthen the joint custody preference. The changes in the decision-
making rules make parental cooperation less critical to a successful joint custody
award. Therefore, courts should be more reluctant to abandon joint custody as
a preferred custodial arrangement because one or both parents are refusing to
cooperate in the rearing of the child.
Former Article 131 directed the court to consider twelve factors in an action
for sole custody in determining whether the presumption in favor of joint custody
had been rebutted.6' In the revision, the twelve factors provide a guide to the
court in determining the best interest of the child in all custody and visitation
disputes, whether between parents or between parents and nonparents. 65 Some
62. I
63. See Plemer v. Plemer, 436 So. 2d 1348, 1351 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), which granted to
the domiciliary parent "ultimate authority for the minor's education and medical treatment," and
Smith v. Smith, 459 So. 2d 646, 648 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984), which granted the domiciliary parent
"the final authority, in case of disagreement, on major medical treatment and education of the
children."
64. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2)(a)-(/) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131
by 1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
65. La. Civ. Code art. 134 provides:
The court shall consider all relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child.
Such factors may include:
(1) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and the child.
(2) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love, affection, and
spiritual guidance and to continue the education and rearing of the child.
(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with food, clothing,
medical care, and other material needs.
(4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate environment, and the
desirability of maintaining continuity of that environment.
(5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial home or
homes.
(6) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child.
(7) The mental and physical health of each party.
(8) The home, school, and community history of the child.
(9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient
age to express a preference.
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changes have been made. The inclusion in prior Article 131(C)(2)(b) of
consideration of raising the child in his religion or creed has been eliminated.
The moral fitness of the parents is now a factor to be considered only insofar as
it affects the welfare of the child." This reflects the jurisprudential rule that
moral misconduct should be considered only if it has a detrimental effect on the
child, not to regulate the moral behavior of the parents. 67 A new factor is
added: the responsibility for the caring and rearing of the child previously
exercised by each party." Which parent or other person has been the primary
caretaker of the child is an important factor in considering who should be the
domiciliary parent or awarded sole custody. Comment (i) to Article 134 contains
ten examples of caretaking duties.69
The twelve factors provided in Article 134 are illustrative. The prior act
required consideration of evidence introduced with respect to all of the listed
twelve factors.7° The new article directs the court to consider all relevant
factors in determining the best interest of the child. All the specified factors may
not be relevant in every case.
Prior Article 131 included the distance between the respective residences of
the parties as a factor to be considered in determining whether the presumption
that joint custody is in the best interest of a child had been rebutted.7 It also
provided that when the award of joint custody had been made to parents
domiciled in Louisiana and either parent changed his domicile to another state,
the presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child ceased to
exist.72  In the revision, the distance factor has been retained as one of the
factors that may be considered in determining the child's best interest in all
custody disputes. The provision that removal of domicile from Louisiana
terminates the joint custody presumption has not been retained. Distance
between the residences of the parties should be a factor in determining the best
(10) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage a close and
continuing relationship between the child and the other party.
(11) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
(12) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously exercised by each
party.
66. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2)(f) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by
1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided as a factor "[t]he moral
fitness of the parties involved." Present La. Civ. Code art. 134(6) provides as a factor "[t]he moral
fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the child."
67. See La. Civ. Code art. 134 cmt. (f) for a full review of this jurisprudence.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 134(12).
69. La. Civ. Code art. 134 cmt. (i).
70. La. Civ. Code art. 134 cmt. (b); Matthews v. Matthews, 633 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1993).
71. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2)(k) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by
1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8. and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
72. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(K) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
73. La. Civ. Code art. 134(11).
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interest of a child. However, with the new decision-making rules and the ability
of parents to communicate instantly when necessary by telephone or other means,
the distance separating the parents assumes less importance in determining
whether sole custody is a better custody arrangement than joint custody.74
Removal of a parent from Louisiana should not, of itself, constitute a sufficient
reason to terminate the joint custody arrangement. The move and the resulting
distance between the parents should be only one factor to consider in determining
which custodial arrangement will be in the best interest of the child.'5
One of the incongruities of the former joint custody act was that, in a
custody dispute between parents, the parties were required to allege facts to
support a parent's request for sole custody or to be designated as the child's
domiciliary parent, not the ultimate conclusion that the child's best interest would
be served by such an award. However, in a contest between the parents and a
74. For cases discussing the lessening importance of distance between the parents, see Jordan
v. Jordan, 493 So. 2d 759 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986), and Doyle v. Doyle, 465 So. 2d 167 (La. App.
3d Cir.), writ denied, 467 So. 2d 1136 (1985).
75. The adoption of the non-consensual joint custody statute in 1982 has had a profound effect
on the right of a custodial parent to relocate to another state while retaining custodial rights.
Previously, the jurisprudence permitted such a move if the custodian had good economic or personal
reasons for living in another state and if the move was consistent with the welfare of the child.
Wilmot v. Wilmot, 223 La. 221, 65 So. 2d 321 (1953); Griffin v. Griffin, 424 So. 2d 1228 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1982); Broomfield v. Broomfield, 283 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1973). Since the
adoption of the joint custody statute, the judicial trend has been one of disapproval. See Key v. Key,
519 So. 2d 319 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988), Sandifer v. Sandifer, 514 So. 2d 510 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1987), Risher v. Risher, 511 So. 2d 1220 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1987), Sambola v. Sambola, 493 So. 2d
206 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986), Lachney v. Lachney, 446 So. 2d 923 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied,
450 So. 2d 964 (1984), and Bezou v. Bezou, 436 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983). In Bezou,
the Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs and stayed execution of the trial court. Bezou v. Bezou,
437 So. 2d 285 (La. 1983).
This trend reflects a recognition of the policy inherent in joint custody that a child be assured of
frequent and continuing contact with both parents. It also acknowledges the importance of the non-
domiciliary parent's rights. The rights of a non-custodial parent were practically non-existent except
for inheritance under the former sole custodial scheme of custody.
The removal of a child to another state is a major decision affecting the welfare of the child and
is, therefore, subject to judicial review upon motion of the other parent under La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3)
(Supp. 1994), provided the original implementation plan does not contain a provision regulating the
right of a domiciliary parent to remove the child from the jurisdiction of the court. See supra note
61 for the text of La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3). As a result of the Revision, in addition to the factor of the
distance between the respective residences of the parties resulting from an interstate move, factors
numbered (4), (5), (8), (9), and (10) of La. Civ. Code art. 134 may be particularly appropriate factors
to consider in determining whether the move is in the best interest of the child. See supra note 65
for the text of La. Civ. Code art. 134. In fact, the courts have addressed these considerations in the
cases cited above, but not as statutory factors to consider in determining the best interest of the child
in all custody and visitation disputes. These factors formerly were considered only in determining
whether the presumption in favor of joint custody had been rebutted. See former La. Civ. Code art.
146(C)(2) (1870), quoted supra note 19. However, the courts in Sambola, Risher, Sandifer, and Key.
supra, used these and similar considerations in determining that the move was not in the best interest
of the child, but refused to change a joint custody award to sole custody, preferring to simply change
the domiciliary parent while maintaining joint custody.
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nonparent, factual pleadings were not required and were expressly prohibited.
Only a statement of the ultimate fact that parental custody would be detrimental
to the child was permitted.76 This provision has not been retained.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:335 retains the following requirements from
former Louisiana Civil Code article 131: (1) the court must render a joint
custody implementation order, except for good cause shown, when joint custody
is decreed," (2) the implementation order shall allocate the time periods during
vhich each parent shall have physical custody of the child so the child is assured
frequent and continuing contact with both parents,78 and (3) the implementation
order allocate the legal authority and responsibility of the parents."
The concept of a domiciliary parent has been incorporated into the statute.8s
The court must designate a domiciliary parent except where an implementation
order provides otherwise or good cause is shown for not naming a domiciliary
parent.8  The domiciliary parent is defined as the parent with whom the child
primarily resides.8 The designation of a domiciliary parent must be made in
the decree of joint custody, not in the implementation order."3 This is to ensure
a domiciliary parent is designated, even in those instances in which a joint
custody implementation order is not rendered. The naming of a domiciliary
parent in the joint custody decree, without more, produces three legal results:
1. The child shall primarily reside with that parent;
2. The other parent has physical custody during time periods that
assure that the child has frequent and continuing contact with both
parents; and
3. The decision-making rules of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:335(B)(3)
apply.
84
76. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(B) (1870) redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided in part: "Allegations that
parental custody would be detrimental to the child, other than a statement of that ultimate fact, shall
not appear in the pleadings."
77. La. R.S. 9:335(A)(1) (Supp. 1994). Prior Article 131 obligated the court to require the
parents to submit a plan of implementation of the custody order, unless waived by the court for good
cause shown. The new article obligates the court to render a joint custody implementation order
except for good cause shown.
78. La. R.S. 9:335(A)(2) (Supp. 1994).
79. La. R.S. 9:335(A)(3) (Supp. 1994).
80. La. R.S. 9:335(B)(1) (Supp. 1994) provides: "In a decree of joint custody the court shall
designate a domiciliary parent except when there is an implementation order to the contrary or for
other good cause shown."
81. Id
82. La. R.S. 9:335(B)(2) (Supp. 1994).
83. La. R.S. 9:335(B)(1) (Supp. 1994) provides: "In a decree of joint custody the court shall
designate a domiciliary parent except when there is an implementation order to the contrary or for
other good cause shown."
84.* See supra text accompanying notes 57-63 for a discussion of these new decision-making
rules.
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Former Article 131 (A)(1)(a) provided that the plan for.implementation of the
joint custody order may include designation of the child's legal domicile. To fill
a hiatus in former Article 131,85 attorneys and the courts crafted the term
domiciliary parent, the parent with whom the child primarily resided.' That
term and definition have been adopted in the new act. It is more important to
define the relationship between the child and the parent with whom the child
primarily resides than to designate the place of the child's legal domicile. The
domicile of a minor is defined in Louisiana Civil Code article 3987 and the
jurisprudence interpreting it, and it need not be addressed in an implementation
plan for joint custody.
The purpose of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:3358 is to set forth the basic,
mandatory minimum requirements of a decree of joint custody and a joint
85. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(I)(a) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by
1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided that the implementation
plan for joint custody may include the designation of the child's legal domicile, but it did not define
any special legal relationship between the child and the parent who lived at that domicile with the
child. Joint custody contemplated that the parents would stand on equal footing with respect to the
child. They enjoyed the natural cotutorship of the children pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 250, which
granted equal authority, privileges and responsibilities to the parents.
86. See Montet v. Montet, 629 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), in which the court
struggled with the legal effect of naming the father as the domiciliary parent and the rights conferred
in a case in which the court ordered that the children spend exactly equal amounts of time with each
parent. The court correctly observed: "In child custody cases, the words 'domiciliary parent' are
generally used to describe the parent in whose home the child spends most of his time." Id. at 540.
87. La. Civ. Code art. 39 provides: "The domicile of a minor not emancipated is that of his
father, mother, or tutor; a person of full age, under interdiction, has his domicile with his curator."
88. La. R.S. 9:335 (Supp. 1994) provides:
A. (1) In a proceeding in which joint custody is decreed, the court shall render a joint
custody implementation order except for good cause shown.
(2)(a) The implementation order shall allocate the time periods during which each
parent shall have physical custody of the child so that the child is assured of frequent and
continuing contact with both parents.
(3) The implementation order shall allocate the legal authority and responsibility of the
parents.
B. (1) In a decree of joint custody the court shall designate a domiciliary parent except
when there is an implementation order to the contrary or for other good cause shown.
(2) The domiciliary parent is the parent with whom the child shall primarily reside, but
the other parent shall have physical custody during time periods that assure that the child
has frequent and continuing contact with both parents.
(3) The domiciliary parent shall have authority to make all decisions affecting the child
unless an implementation order provides otherwise. All major decisions made by the
domiciliary parent concerning the child shall be subject to review by the court upon
motion of the other parent. It shall be presumed that all major decisions made by the
domiciliary parent are in the best interest of the child.
C. If a domiciliary parent is not designated in the joint custody decree and an
implementation order does not provide otherwise, joint custody confers upon the parents
the same rights and responsibilities as are conferred on them by the provisions of Title
VII of Book 1 of the Civil Code.
1994]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
custody implementation order, if one is rendered. Other provisions may be
inserted, of course, either by the agreement of the parties or court order.
However, if the implementation order does not allocate the legal authority and
responsibilities of each parent, or no implementation order is rendered, decision-
making rules and the rights and responsibilities conferred on the parents are
imposed by law.89 These provisions fill the troublesome hiatus in the former
joint custody statute.
If neither the custody decree nor an implementation order designates a
domiciliary parent, the rights and responsibilities of the parties are governed by
the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code articles 215-245. 90 The parties should
carefully consider the consequences of the failure to designate a domiciliary
parent.9'
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:335(A)(2)(a), as enacted by Act 261, requires
the implementation plan to allocate the time periods during which each parent
shall have physical custody of the child so the child is assured frequent and
continuing contact with both parents.92 Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:335(A)(2)
appears as two sub-paragraphs:
(2)(a) The implementation order shall allocate the time periods during
which each parent shall have physical custody of the child so that the
child is assured of frequent and continuing contact with both parents.
(b) To the extent it is feasible, physical custody of the children shall
be shared equally.
Prior Louisiana Civil Code article 131(D) provided, in part, that joint
custody "shall mean the parents shall, to the extent feasible, share the physical
custody of children of the marriage." Article 131(D) was amended by Act 905
of 199393 to add: "To the extent it is feasible, physical custody of the children
shall be shared equally." The Law Institute proposal, Act 261, did not contain
this provision. The courts have held that, although a frequent and continuing
relationship with both parents is the primary aim of the joint custody provisions,
joint custody does not necessarily require an equal sharing of physical custo-
dy." However, joint custody does not preclude such an arrangement in an
89. La. R.S. 9:335(B)(3) (Supp. 1994).
90. La. R.S. 9:335(C) (Supp. 1994).
91. For example, although the child would remain under the authority of his father and mother,
in case of differences between the parents, the authority of the father prevails. La. Civ. Code art.
216. The father would be the administrator of the estate of the minor child until the divorce. La.
Civ. Code art. 221.
92. La. R.S. 9:335(A)(2)(a) (Supp. 1994) provides: "The implementation order shall allocate
the time periods during which each parent shall have physical custody of the child so that the child
is assured of frequent and continuing contact with both parents."
93. 1993 La. Acts No. 905 was not a Louisiana Law Institute proposal.
94. Montet v. Montet, 629 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993); Stanley v. Stanley, 592 So. 2d
862 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); Flournoy v. Flournoy, 546 So. 2d 617 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1989); Brooks
v. Brooks, 469 So. 2d 398 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); Doyle v. Doyle, 465 So. 2d 167 (La. App. 3d
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appropriate situation. Equal sharing of physical custody is generally not feasible,
especially with school age children.95
The Louisiana State Law Institute, as the official law revision commission
of the State of Louisiana," is mandated to prepare, at the close of each
legislative session, a printer's copy containing the text of all the new legislation
of a general and public nature, assigning to these laws an appropriate Title,
Chapter, and Section number, and indicating the source of the legislative act
from which they are taken.' In preparing the printer's copy, the Louisiana
State Law Institute may not alter the sense, meaning, or effect of any act of the
Legislature."
Cir.), writ denied, 467 So. 2d 1136 (1985); Peters v. Peters, 449 So. 2d 1372 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1984); Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984); Duhe v. Duhe, 451 So. 2d 1198
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1984).
95. Stanley v. Stanley, 592 So. 2d 862 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991); Swope v. Swope, 521 So. 2d
656 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988); Allen v. Allen, 484 So. 2d 277 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986); Hull v. Hull,
499 So. 2d 1037 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1986).
96. La. R.S. 24:251 (1989) provides: "The Louisiana State Law Institute, as the official law
revision commission of the State of Louisiana, shall direct and supervise the continuous revision,
clarification and co-ordination of the Louisiana Revised Statutes in a manner not inconsistent with
the provisions of this Chapter."
97. La. R.S. 24:252 (Supp. 1994) provides:
A. At the close of each legislative session the Louisiana State Law Institute shall prepare
printer's copy, either for a supplement to the Revised Statutes of 1950, or for a volume
to be called "Louisiana Revised Statutes", containing the text of the Louisiana Revised
Statutes of 1950 as they may have been amended, and omitting therefrom or noting
therein, those sections that have been repealed. There shall also be incorporated therein,
in an appropriate place and classification, the text of all the new legislation of a general
and public nature, assigning to these laws an appropriate Title, Chapter, and Section
number, and indicating the source of the legislative acts from which they are taken.
B. When a conflict between two or more legislative acts affecting the same subject matter
in the same provision of law cannot be resolved for the purpose of incorporating the text
into the Revised Statutes, the Louisiana State Law Institute shall so notify the secretary
of the Senate and the clerk of the House of Representatives prior to preparing the printer's
copy. The secretary and the clerk shall certify jointly which of the conflicting legislative
acts was enacted last and jointly shall direct the institute to incorporate into the Revised
Statutes the text of the provision of law last enacted.
C. The Louisiana State Law Institute shall also prepare and attach to the printer's copy
a list, by number and title only, of the local, special, and private acts enacted at that
session of the legislature.
98. La. R.S. 24:253 (1989) provides:
In preparing the printer's copy provided for in R. S. 24:252, the Louisiana State Law
Institute shall not alter the sense, meaning or effect of any act of the legislature, but it
may:
(I) Renumber and rearrange sections or parts of sections;
(2) Transfer sections or divide sections so as to give to distinct subject matters a separate
section number, but without changing the meaning;
(3) Insert or change the wording of headnotes;
(4) Change reference numbers to agree with renumbered chapters or sections;
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When inconsistent amendments to the same statute have been adopted at the
same legislative session, the statutes should be construed, if possible, in a manner
so as to give effect to both amendments, consistent with legislative intent.
99
The Louisiana State Law Institute is mandated to resolve, if possible, any conflict
between two or more legislative acts affecting the same subject matter in the
same provision of law for the purpose of incorporating the text into the Louisiana
Revised Statutes."°° The staff of the Louisiana State Law Institute, in an
attempt to reconcile the apparent conflict between Acts 261 and 905, inserted
"To the extent it is feasible, physical custody of the children shall be shared
equally," as an amendment to the newly enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:335(A), defining the contents and effects of the joint custody decree and
implementation order. It was inserted as paragraph A(2)(b) in Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:335.'0' Act 905 amended Louisiana Civil Code article 131(D), Act
261 repealed and reenacted Louisiana Civil Code article 131 effective January
1, 1994. Act 261 also enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:335 without any
provision for equal physical custody of children.
There is a better and proper way to reconcile the provisions of Acts 261 and
905. Act 905 amended Louisiana Civil Code article 131(D). This amendment
became effective on August 15, 1993."° Louisiana Civil Code article 131(D)
continued in effect, as amended, until January 1, 1994, the effective date of Act
261.'03 On January 1, 1994, Louisiana Civil Code article 131, as amended and
(5) Substitute the proper section or chapter number for the terms "this act", "the
preceding section" and the like;
(6) Strike out figures where they are merely a repetition of written words and vice-versa;
(7) Change capitalization for the purpose of uniformity;
(8) Correct manifest typographical and grammatical errors, and
(9) Make any other purely formal or clerical changes in keeping with the purpose of the
revision.
The Institute shall omit all titles of acts, all enacting, resolving, and repealing clauses,
all appropriation measures, all temporary statutes, all declarations of emergency, and all
validity, declaration of policy, and construction clauses, except when the retention thereof
is necessary to preserve the full meaning and intent of the law. Whenever any validity,
declaration of policy, or construction clause is omitted, proper notation of the omission
shall be made.
99. State v. Piazza, 596 So. 2d 817 (La. 1992); City of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors,
216 La. 116, 43 So. 2d 237 (1949).
100. La. R.S. 24:252(B) (Supp. 1994).
101. See the Editor's Note to La. R.S. 9:335 in Louisiana Civil Code (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed.,
West 1994), and the Historical and Statutory Notes to La. R.S. 9:335 (Supp. 1994).
102. La. Const. art. III, § 19:
All laws enacted during a regular session of the legislature shall take effect on August
fifteenth of the calendar year in which the regular session is held and all laws enacted
during an extraordinary session of the legislature shall take effect on the sixtieth day after
final adjournment of the extraordinary session in which they were enacted. All laws shall
be published prior thereto in the official journal of the state as provided by law.
However, any bill may specify an earlier or later effective date.
103. 1993 La. Acts No. 261, § 12 provides: "This Act shall become effective on January 1,
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reenacted by Act 261, and Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:335, as enacted by Act
261, became effective. There is thus no statutory mandate for equal sharing of
physical custody effective January 1, 1994.
This was the method utilized in reconciling two statutes passed at the same
legislative session in City of New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors.'° Two
acts, Acts 234 and 351 of 1948, became law on the same day. Act 234 provided
for a mayor and 7 commissioners elected from the city's municipal districts for
the City of New Orleans. Act 351 provided for only 5 councilmen to be elected
at large. The court reconciled the two acts by holding that the purpose of the
later act, Act 351, was to "freeze" the commissioners in the offices they were
occupying and to maintain them in office until the expiration of their terms in
1950, and Act 234 was intended to make changes in the structure of the
municipal government to take effect only at the time the successors to the
commissioners who were frozen in office by Act 351 were elected and take
office, that is, in 1950.105
The obligation of the parents to exchange information concerning the health,
education, and welfare of the child and to confer with each other in exercising
decision-making authority is continued.'0° Although a parent is vested with
decision-making authority, this does not relieve that parent of the obligation to
discuss with the other parent the circumstances about which a decision needs to
be made.
The right of a parent, although not the child's custodial or domiciliary
parent, to obtain access to records and information pertaining to a minor child,
including medical, dental, and school records, has been preserved.1
0 7
Act 261 also preserves the allocation of the dependency exemption granted
to a parent by the provisions of any revenue law and the protection afforded a,
parent to whom the dependency allocation has been made if the allocation is not
maintained by the taxing authorities.0 8 Two changes are made in these
1994." Effective January 1, 1994, Louisiana Civil Code article 131, as amended and reenacted by
1993 La. Acts No. 261, § 1, provides: "In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court shall
award custody of a child in accordance with the best interest of the child."
104. 216 La. 116, 43 So. 2d 237 (1949).
105. See also Rackley v. State, 146 So. 459 (Miss. 1933) (holding that, if two laws are in
necessary conflict, passed on the same day, but "go into effect on different days, the one taking effect
last will become the law from that day").
106. La. R.S. 9:336 (Supp. 1994) provides: "Joint custody obligates the parents to exchange
information concerning the health, education, and welfare of the child and to confer with one another
in exercising decision-making authority."
107. La. R.S. 9:351 (Supp. 1994) provides: "Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, access to records and information pertaining to a minor child, including but not limited to
medical, dental, and school records, shall not be denied to a parent solely because he is not the
child's custodial or domiciliary parent."
108. La. R.S. 9:337(B) (Supp. 1994) provides:
The decree or implementation order may also allocate to either parent any dependency
exemption granted to a parent by provisions of any revenue law; and if that allocation is
not maintained by the taxing authorities, then the parent who receives the benefit of the
1994]
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provisions. Formerly, they were to be contained in the implementation order;
now they may be in either the joint custody decree or the implementation order.
Formerly, the allocation of the dependency exemption was mandatory; now it is
discretionary.
The right of relatives by blood or affinity, who were not granted custody, to
have reasonable visitation rights with the child has been revised.' °9 Like
former Louisiana Civil Code article 132(B), present Louisiana Civil Code article
136(B) provides that, under "extraordinary circumstances," such a relative may
be granted reasonable visitation rights with the child if the court finds it is in the
best interest of the child. In addition to a finding of "extraordinary circumstanc-
es," the consideration of five factors is mandated in determining whether it is in
the best interest of the child for the relative to be granted visitation privileges."0
exemption for such tax year shall not be considered as having received payment of a thing
not due.
No change was made in La. R.S. 9:315.13 (1991), a portion of the child support guidelines statute:
The amounts set forth in the schedule in R. S. 9:315.14 presume that the custodial or
domiciliary party has the right to claim the federal and state tax dependency deductions
and any earned income credit. However, the claiming of dependents for federal and state
income tax purposes shall be as provided by the Internal Revenue Code.
Therefore, if the dependency deductions are allocated to the non-custodial or non-domiciliary parent
pursuant to La. R.S. 9:337(B) (Supp. 1994), this may occasion a deviation from the guideline amount
pursuant to La. R.S. 9:315.13 (1991).
109. La. Civ. Code art. 136(A) provides that "a parent not granted custody or joint custody of
a child is entitled to reasonable visitation rights unless the court finds, after a hearing, that visitation
would not be in the best interest of the child." If there is an award of joint custody, the non-
domiciliary parent is not awarded visitation rights, but periods of physical custody of the child. La.
R.S. 9:335(A)(2) and (B)(2) (Supp. 1994). If one parent is awarded custody pursuant to La. Civ.
Code art. 132, the other parent may be awarded reasonable visitation rights under La. Civ. Code art.
136(A). If a third party is awarded custody pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 133, both parents may be
awarded visitation rights under La. Civ. Code art. 136(A).
This revision of the child custody provisions maintains the clear distinction between custody and
visitation reflected in all the Louisiana Law Institute proposals discussed in the Introduction to this
article. See La. Civ. Code arts. 105, 136; La. R.S. 9:331, 332, and 343-345 (Supp. 1994); La. Code
Civ. P. art. 2592(8). La. Civ. Code art. 136 cmt. (b) states that the declaration in Maxwell v.
LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375 (La. 1983), that visitation is a "species of custody" is no longer strictly true,
since visitation has an independent basis under Article 136. This distinction between custody and
visitation was urged by the author but rejected by the court in Clark v. Clark, 600 So. 2d 880 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1992). writ denied, 604 So. 2d 1305 (1992), a case involving an interpretation of La.
Code Civ. P. art. 74.2. This case was a sequel to Clark v. Clark, 550 So. 2d 913 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1989).
110. Both former La. Civ. Code art. 132(B) and present La. Civ. Code'art. 136(B) provide:
Under extraordinary circumstances, a relative by blood or affinity, not granted custody of
the child may be granted reasonable visitation rights if the court finds that it is in the best
interest of the child. In determining the best interest of the child, the court shall consider:
(1) The length and quality of the prior relationship between the child and the relative.
(2) Whether the child is in need of guidance, enlightenment, or tutelage which can best
be provided by the relative.
(3) The preference of the child if he is determined to be of sufficient maturity to express
a preference.
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Former Article 132(C) provided that, in the event of a conflict between that
Louisiana Civil Code article and Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:572, the Louisiana
Revised Statutes provisions superseded those of the Louisiana Civil Code
article."' Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:572(A) provided four situations in
which the parents of a party to a marriage without custody could be awarded
reasonable visitation rights with their minor grandchild upon a finding that such
visitation would be in the best interest of the child-i.e., when the party to a
marriage without custody (1) was legally separated, (2) was divorced, (3) was
now dead, or (4) was interdicted." 2  Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:572(C)
provided that if the parents of the child lived in open concubinage and one of the
parents died, the parents of the deceased party could have reasonable visitation
rights with the minor child if the court found both (1) that the grandparents had
been unreasonably denied visitation rights and (2) that such visitation rights
would be in the best interest of the child." 3  Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:572(D) provided that, in three of the four situations outlined in paragraph (A),
legal separation, divorce, or death of a parent of a child, the siblings of the minor
child could have reasonable visitation rights with the minor child if the court
made the dual finding (1) that the siblings had been unreasonably denied
visitation rights and (2) that such visitation rights would be in the best interest
of the child." 4 If the parent of a minor child was interdicted, the siblings of
(4) The willingness of the relative to encourage a close relationship between the child and
his parent or parents.
(5) The mental and physical health of the child and the relative.
Unlike the factors in La. Civ. Code art. 134, these factors do not appear to be illustrative.
111. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146.1(C) (1988), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 132 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided: "In the event of a conflict
between this Article and R. S. 9:572, the provisions of R. S. 9:572 shall supersede those of this
Article." Present La. Civ. Code art. 136(C) provides: "In the event of a conflict between this Article
and R. S. 9:344 or 345, the provisions of the statute shall supersede those of this Article." The
reference to La. R.S. 9:345 (Supp. 1994) seems to be inadvertent, as that section permits the
appointment of an attorney to represent the child and is not in conflict with La. Civ. Code art. 136.
112. Former La. R.S. 9:572(A) (repealed 1993) provided:
If one of the parties to a marriage dies or is interdicted, or the obligation to live together
is terminated by an action of separation from bed and board, or the marriage is terminated
by divorce, and there is a minor child or children of such marriage, the parents of the
deceased, interdicted, separated, or divorced party without custody of such minor child or
children, may have reasonable visitation rights to the child or children of the marriage
during their minority, if the court in its discretion finds that such visitation rights would
be in the best interest of the child or children.
113. Former La. R.S. 9:572(C) (repealed 1993) provided:
When the parents of a minor child or children live in concubinage and one of the parents
dies, the parents of the deceased party may have reasonable visitation rights to the child
or children during their minority, if the court in its discretion finds that the grandparents
have been unreasonably denied visitation rights and such visitation rights would be in the
best interest of the child or children.
114. Former La. R.S. 9:572(D) (repealed 1993) provided:
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the minor child were not afforded visitation privileges. Several things are
apparent in this scheme in former Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:572. Visitation
rights were limited to grandparents and siblings. For these relations, no finding
of "extraordinary circumstances" was required. In the four situations in
paragraph (A), only the parents of a party to the marriage without custody could
be granted visitation. The parents of a party to the marriage with custody could
not. In the three situations in which siblings of the minor could be awarded
visitation rights, the siblings additionally had to show they had been unreason-
ably denied visitation rights; grandparents did not. Both grandparents and
siblings had to show their visitation rights would be in the best interest of the
child. In the case of death of a parent living in concubinage, parents of the
deceased party had to show an unreasonable denial of visitation and that the
visitation right would be in the best interest of the child; siblings had no
visitation rights. These provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:572 were
special requirements governing visitation in the enumerated instances and
superseded the general provisions of former Article 132, which granted
reasonable visitation to any relative, by blood or affinity, not granted custody of
the child, upon a showing that the circumstances were "extraordinary" and that
visitation was in the best interest of the child.
All this was the result of piecemeal legislation. The issue of which persons,
besides the parents of a child, if any, should be awarded visitation rights has
been a controversial issue in the Legislature. The above-mentioned provisions
have been retained in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:344,"5 with two changes.
In paragraphs (A) and (C), legal separation or divorce of a parent as a circum-
stance in which the grandparents and siblings may be granted visitation has been
eliminated. Therefore, the provisions of these paragraphs are inapplicable when
If one of the parties to a marriage dies, the obligation to live together is terminated by an
action of separation from bed and board, or the marriage is terminated by divorce, the
siblings of a minor child or chiltren of the marriage may have reasonable visitation rights
to such child or children during their minority if the court in its discretion finds that such
visitation rights would be in the best interest of the child or children and that the siblings
have been unreasonably denied visitation rights.
115. La. R.S. 9:344 (Supp. 1994) provides:
A. If one of the parties to a marriage dies or is interdicted and there is a minor child or
children of such marriage, the parents of the deceased or interdicted party without custody
of such minor child or children may have reasonable visitation rights to the child or
children of the marriage during their minority, if the court in its discretion finds that such
visitation rights would be in the best interest of the child or children.
B. When the parents of a minor child or children live in concubinage and one of the
parents dies, the parents of the deceased party may have reasonable visitation rights to the
child or children during their minority, if the court in its discretion finds that such
visitation rights would be in the best interest of the child or children.
C. If one of the parties to a marriage dies, the siblings of a minor child or children of the
marriage may have reasonable visitation rights to such child or children during their
minority if the court in its discretion finds that such visitation rights would be in the best
interest of the child or children.
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the party to a marriage (parent of the minor child) is divorced, in which case
Article 136(B) applies. In these instances, in addition to demonstrating that
visitation is in the best interest of the child, the grandparent or the sibling
seeking visitation rights must prove that the circumstances justifying visitation
are "extraordinary." This imposes a more onerous burden on grandparents and
siblings seeking visitation in the event of divorce of the parent of a minor child
than was previously the case.
Additionally, the requirement that the grandparents, in the case of the death
of a parent living in concubinage, and the siblings, in the case of the death of a
married parent, show that they have been unreasonably denied visitation rights
has not been retained.
Also, the class of persons who may be awarded visitation rights under
Louisiana Civil Code article 136(B) is not limited to grandparents and siblings,
as in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:344, but may include any relative of the child,
by blood or affinity.
New Louisiana Civil Code article 245 provides that, in custody proceedings
and change of custody proceedings involving an illegitimate child acknowledged
by both parents, where custody is sought by both parents, custody should be
awarded in accordance with the provisions on custody incident to divorce
contained in Title V of Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code." 6 Thus, the same
rules governing the custody of a legitimate child expressly apply to an
illegitimate child acknowledged by both parents in a custody dispute between the
parents." 7 These same rules, including the basic best interest of the child test,
should also be applied in custody disputes between the parent or parents of an
illegitimate child and a third party seeking custody, insofar as they are applicable
to a parent-third party custodial dispute." 8
Prior Louisiana Civil Code article 131 " 9 provided that a custody hearing
may be held in private chambers of the judge. This was too restrictive. The
prior article did not authorize a court to conduct a custody trial in the courtroom
by closing the hearing to the public without the consent of the parties, which was
a common practice. Present Louisiana Civil Code article 135 grants the court
flexibility in choosing the setting for a closed custody hearing and permits it to
116. Title V of Book I of the Louisiana Civil Code (Divorce) consists of Articles 102 through
159, including Articles 131-136, which regulate child custody.
117. La. Civ. Code art. 245 limits the application of the provisiohs on custody incident to
divorce to a custody dispute between the parents of an illegitimate child acknowledged by both
parents.
118. McKinley v. McKinley, 631 So. 2d 45 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1994), applied former Article
131(B) to a parent-third party custodial dispute involving an illegitimate child. There may be facts
in a custody or visitation dispute involving an illegitimate child not acknowledged by both parents
which will militate against the application of all those custody and visitation provisions. See La. Civ.
Code art. 136 cmt. (c), and Maxwell v. LeBlanc, 434 So. 2d 375 (La. 1983).
119. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(G) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10. This was consistent with La. Code Civ.
P. art. 2595, which provides that a summary proceeding may be tried in open court or in chambers.
19941
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
utilize the courtroom facilities while maintaining the confidentiality of the
proceedings.'20
Several provisions governing procedure, formerly contained in the Louisiana
Civil Code, have been moved to Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes, the
Louisiana Civil Code ancillaries. These include the evaluation of a party or the
child,'12  mediation of custody or visitation differences,' 2 2 the joint custody
decree and implementation order,"3 the obligation of joint custodians to
confer,'2 ' access to records of the child,'" the allocation of the dependency
exemption for income tax purposes, '2 and restrictions on visitation.' 7 Some
changes have been made in these provisions.
Former Louisiana Civil Code article 131(H) provided that an evaluation may
be ordered on the motion of either party. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:331
provides that the court may order an evaluation for good cause shown. The new
provision requires an affirmative showing of the necessity or desirability of an
evaluation. An evaluation should be ordered only in those cases in which the
mental health professional, because of his expertise, can assist the court in its
custody determination; it should not simply constitute a substitute fact-finding
procedure. Some reasonable basis for an evaluation by a mental health
professional should be required before one is ordered. Louisiana Civil Code
article 131(H) also implied that the evaluation must include all parties to the
custody or visitation dispute and the child to be evaluated. 2 8  This is not
120. La. Civ. Code art. 135 provides: "A custody hearing may be closed to the public."
However, the court is bound by any other statutory limitations on the judicial proceedings that may
be conducted other than in open court. See Emfinger v. Emfinger, 550 So. 2d 754 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1989) (holding that divorce proceedings were not properly conducted in private chambers even
though custody issues were being resolved at the same time),
121. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(H) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, now La. R.S. 9:331 (Supp. 1994).
122. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(I) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, and La. R.S. 9:351-356 (1991), now La.
R.S. 9:332-333 (Supp. 1994).
123. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(1) and (D) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131
by 1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, now La. R.S. 9:335 (Supp.
1994).
124. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(D) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, now La. R.S. 9:336 (Supp. 1994).
125. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(J) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8. and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, now La. R.S. 9:351 (Supp. 1994).
126. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(1)(c)(ii) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131
by 1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, now La. R.S. 9:337(B) (Supp.
1994).
127. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146 (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990 La.
Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, and La. R.S. 9:574 (1991), now La. R.S.
9:341 (Supp. 1994).
128. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(H) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided in part, that "[t]he court...
shall order both parties and the children to submit to and cooperate in the evaluation, testing, or
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necessary in every case. There may be a condition or situation concerning one
party or the child that alone should be the focus of the evaluation by the mental
health professional. Therefore, the court is given the authority to order an
evaluation of a party, specified parties, the child, or all parties, as the circum-
stances dictate.' 29  The discretion of the court to order an evaluation is
retained.
The definition, in Louisiana Civil Code article 131(H), of a mental health
professional as a psychiatrist or a person who possesses a master's degree in
counseling, social work, psychology, or marriage and family counseling has been
suppressed. The provision was too restrictive. The court should be given
discretion in choosing the person with the qualifications appropriate to the
particular issue. Mental health counselors, physicians practicing psychiatry,
psychologists, and board certified social workers are all defined and regulated by
statute. ,3o
The mediation provisions, formerly in Louisiana Civil Code article 1311"
and in the Louisiana Revised Statutes, 3 2 are now all in the Louisiana Revised
Statutes.'33 Previously, any communication between a mediator and a party or
between parties in the presence of the mediator, except those reflected in the
mediation agreement, was confidential, was considered a privileged communica-
tion, and was not admissible as evidence in any proceeding except with the
consent of both parties.'" Present Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:332(C) makes
any evidence of conduct in mediation as well as statements made in mediation
inadmissible in any proceeding. 35
interview by the mental health professional."
129. La. R.S. 9:331 (Supp. 1994) provides, in part, that "[t]he court may order an evaluation of
a party or the child" and "[t]he court may order a party or the child to submit to and cooperate in
the evaluation, testing, or interview by the mental health professional." The singular (party or child)
includes the plural (parties or children). La. Civ. Code art. 3506.
130. Mental health counselors are regulated by La. R.S. 37:1101-1115 (1988 & Supp. 1994),
psychologists are regulated by La. R.S. 37:2351-2366 (1988 & Supp. 1994), board certified social
workers are regulated by La. R.S. 37:2701-2718 (1988 & Supp. 1994), and psychiatrists are regulated
by La. R.S. 37:1261-1292 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
131. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(I) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
132. Former La. R.S. 9:351-356 (1991).
133. La. R.S. 9:332-333 (Supp. 1994).
134. Former La. R.S. 9:355, reenacted as La. R.S. 9:332 (Supp. 1994) by 1993 La. Acts No. 261,
§ 5, provided:
Except as provided in R. S. 9:354, communications between a mediator and a party to a
mediation are confidential. The secrecy of the communication shall be preserved inviolate
as a privileged communication. The communication shall not be admitted into evidence
in any proceeding except withthe consent of both parties. The same protection shall be
given to communications between the parties in the presence of the mediator.
The exception provided in La. R.S. 9:354 (1991) was the settlement incorporated into a mediation
agreement.
135. La. R.S. 9:332(C) (Supp. 1994) provides:
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The language broadens the protection to include the conduct of a party
during mediation, as well as statements made in mediation. 36 This might
include a party's attitude, recalcitrance, and expressions of anger or remorse.
The revision also extends the scope of confidentiality of communications. The
former act protected communications between a mediator and a party to a
mediation and communications between the parties in the presence of the
mediator.' The restriction of the protection of communications between the
parties to those made in the presence of the mediator has been eliminated. The
mediator may suggest that the parties discuss something in private, out of the
presence of the mediator. Anything said by a party to the other during such a
discussion should also be confidential. Any statement "made in mediation," i.e.,
made as a part of the mediation process, whether or not made in the presence of
the mediator, is protected. 3
A party cannot prevent the introduction into evidence of his prior conduct
by disclosing it during mediation, whether or not the other party is already aware
of the conduct. If a party discloses prior conduct during mediation, this does not
preclude the other party from independently obtaining evidence of that conduct
and introducing that evidence in later judicial proceedings. However, the
disclosure itself made in mediation is not admissible in any later proceeding.' 39
Changes were made in the duties of the mediator with respect to the
agreement reached. Previously, it was his duty to advise the parties to obtain
legal review prior to reaching any agreemnent."4 The mediator must now
advise each party to obtain review by an attorney of any agreement reached as
a result of the mediation prior to signing the agreement. 4 ' The removal of
attorneys from the mediation process prior to the parties reaching an agreement
and reducing the agreement to writing should facilitate the mediation process.
Mediation is a non-adversarial process designed to assist the parties in clarifying
issues, identifying alternatives, reducing acrimony, resolving controversy, and
reaching their own agreement.'42 The agreement should be submitted to the
Evidence of conduct or statements made in mediation is not admissible in any proceeding.
This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely
because it is presented in the course of mediation. Facts disclosed, other than conduct or
statements made in mediation, are not inadmissible by virtue of first having been disclosed
in mediation.
136. Id
137. Former La. R.S. 9:355 (1991).
138. La. R.S. 9:332(C) (Supp. 1994). See supra note 135 for the text of La. R.S. 9:332(C)
(Supp. 1994).
139. La. R.S. 9:332(C) (Supp. 1994). See supra note 135 for the text of La. R.S. 9:332(C)
(Supp. 1994).
140. Former La. R.S. 9:353(B) (1991).
141. La. R.S. 9:333(B) (Supp. 1994): "The mediator shall advise each of the parties
particippting in the mediation to obtain review by an attorney of any agreement reached as a result
of the mediation prior to signing such an agreement."
142. See Kenneth Rigby, Alternate Dispute Resolution, 44 La. L. Rev. 1725 (1984); Anita R.
White, Mediation in Child Custody Disputes and a Look at Louisiana, 50 La. L. Rev. 1111 (1990).
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respective parties' attorneys, if they choose to retain attorneys, prior to signing,
for review. The attorneys should consider the legality, enforceability, and legal
consequences to their respective parties, but not approve or disapprove the
content of the agreement itself. The latter would introduce an adversarial
element into the mediation process, and would be inconsistent with it.
Previously, if an agreement was reached, the mediator would prepare and
verify a written, signed, and dated agreement, which set out the settlement terms
of the controversies. 4 3 A consent judgment and/or plan of mediation incorpo-
rating the agreement was prepared by respective counsel for each of the parties
and submitted to the court for its approval and signature.'" These provisions
have been simplified to require that the mediator shall prepare the written,
signed, and dated agreement, and that a consent judgment incorporating the
agreement shall be submitted to the court for its approval. 4
Another change in the mediation proceeding is the authority granted the
court to stay any further determination of custody or visitation for a period not
to exceed thirty days from the date of issuance of an order for mediation.'"
This provision was proposed in response to reports of custody and visitation
proceedings being delayed for many months due to such matters being routinely
referred to mediation and long delays in completing or terminating the mediation
process. Thirty days was deemed sufficient time to either complete the
mediation process or determine that it was not going to be successful.
The prohibition of visitation between a child and a parent who has subjected
the child to or permitted physical or sexual abuse or exploitation has been
continued. 47 Previously, former Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:574 provided
143. Former La. R.S. 9:354(A) (repealed 1993) provided: "Upon the resolution of the
controversies by the parties, the mediator shall prepare a written, signed and dated agreement, verified
by the mediator, setting out the settlement terms of the controversies."
144. Former La. R.S. 9:354(B) and (C) (repealed 1993) provided:
B. If an agreement is reached by the parties through mediation, a consent judgment
and/or plan of mediation incorporating the agreement shall be prepared by respective
counsel for each of the parties.
C. The consent judgment and/or plan of mediation shall be submitted to the court for its
approval and signature.
145. La. R.S. 9:332(B) (Supp. 1994): "If an agreement is reached by the parties, the mediator
shall prepare a written, signed, and dated agreement. A consent judgment incorporating the
agreement shall be submitted to the court for its approval."
146. La. R.S. 9:332(A) (Supp. 1994) provides:
The court may order the parties to mediate their differences in a custody or visitation
proceeding. The mediator may be agreed upon by the parties or, upon their failure to
agree, selected by the court. The court may stay any further determination of custody or
visitation for a period not to exceed thirty days from the date of issuance of such an order.
The court may order the costs of mediation to be paid in advance by either party or both
parties jointly. The court may apportion the costs of the mediation between the parties
if agreement is reached on custody or visitation. If mediation concludes without
agreement between the parties, the costs of mediation shall be taxed as costs of court.
The costs of mediation shall be subject to approval by the court.
147. La. R.S. 9:341 (Supp. 1994), previously in La. Civ. Code art. 133 (1986) and La. R.S.
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that the court may prohibit visitation in such circumstances, whereas former
Louisiana Civil Code article 133 required the court to prohibit visitation. The
latter rule has been retained.
The authorization of a court to require the posting of a bond or other security
to insure compliance with a child visitation order has been retained, but expanded
to include indemnifying the other party for the payment of any costs incurred."
The procedure for the return of a child kept in violation of a custody and
visitation order 9 and the provision for the appointment of an attorney to
represent the child in any child custody or visitation proceeding' 5° are both
retained.
The authorization previously granted to a court to direct that an investigation
be made for the purpose of assisting the court in making a determination whether
an award of joint custody is appropriate"'5 has not been retained. Neither has the
9:574 (1991), provides:
A. Whenever the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a parent has
subjected his or her child to physical abuse, or sexual abuse or exploitation, or has
permitted such abuse or exploitation of the child, the court shall prohibit visitation
between the abusive parent and the abused child until such parent proves that visitation
would not cause physical, emotional, or psychological damage to the child. Should
visitation be allowed, the court shall order such restrictions, conditions, and safeguards
necessary to minimize any risk of harm to the child. All costs incurred in compliance
with the provisions of this Section shall be borne by the abusive parent.
B. When visitation has been prohibited by the court pursuant to Subsection A, and the
court subsequently authorizes restricted visitation, the parent whose visitation has been
restricted shall not remove the child from the jurisdiction of the court except for good
cause shown and with the prior approval of the court.
See La. R.S. 9:361-369 (Supp. 1994), the Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act, a companion
statute imposing similar restrictions on visitation in these circumstances.
148. La. R.S. 9:342 (Supp. 1994), previously in La. R.S. 9:312 (1991). provides:
For good cause shown, a court may, on its own motion or upon the motion of any party,
require the posting of a bond or other security by a party to insure compliance with a
child visitation order and to indemnify the other party for the payment of any costs
incurred.
149. La. R.S. 9:343 (Supp. 1994) provides:
A. Upon presentation of a certified copy of a custody and visitation rights order rendered
by a court of this state, together with the sworn affidavit of the custodial parent, the judge,
who shall have jurisdiction for the limited purpose of effectuating the remedy provided
by this Section by virtue of either the presence of the child or litigation pending before
the court, may issue a civil warrant directed to law enforcement authorities to return the
child to the custodial parent pending further order of the court having jurisdiction over the
matter.
B. The sworn affidavit of the custodial parent shall include all of the following:
(1) A statement that the custody and visitation rights order is true and correct.
(2) A summary of the status of any pending custody proceeding.
(3) The fact of the removal of or failure to return the child in violation of the custody
and visitation rights order.
(4) A declaration that the custodial parent desires the child returned.
150. La. R.S. 9:345 (Supp. 1994).
151. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(3) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
[Vol. 55
CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT LEGISLATION
provision permitting a court, on its own motion, to terminate or modify a joint
custody decree or implementation plan even if one or both parents opposed the
modification or termination order."5 2 The express prohibition of consideration
of a parent's sex and race as factors in custodial determinations 53 is not retained.
Thig prohibition is controlled by constitutional principless that need not be
expressed in statutes. The disposition of a parent to continue raising the child in his
religion or creed... has likewise not been retained because of constitutional
problems inherent in having this as a factor in child custody determinations.
The act contains transitional rules, both with respect to child custody and child
support. 16  The act became effective January 1, 1994. However, it does not
apply to actions for separation from bed and board or divorce or actions for
incidental relief commenced before that date, or to reconventional demands to these
actions, whenever the reconventional demand is filed. These actions are governed
by the law in effect prior to January 1, 1994.'
7
Ill., CHILD SUPPORT
Prior to the enactment of Act 261, the statutory basis for an award of child
support was Louisiana Civil Code article 227,'" which imposed a substantive
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided: "For the purpose of assisting
the court in making a determination whether an award of joint custody is appropriate, the court may
direct that an investigation be conducted."
152. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(E) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by 1990
La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided:
Any order for joint custody, or any plan of implementation effected pursuant to Paragraph
A of this Article, may be modified or terminated upon the petition of one or both parents
or on the court's own motion, if it is shown that the best interest of the child requires
modification or termination of the order. The court shall state in its decision the reasons
for modification or termination of the joint custody order if either parent opposes the
modification or termination order.
153. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2)(1) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by
1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided in part: "[Tihe
classification of persons according to race is neither relevant nor permissible [for purposes of
determining the best interest of the child]."
154. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; La. Const. art. 11.
155. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(C)(2)(b) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131 by
1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided: "The capacity and
disposition of the parties involved to give the child love, affection, and guidance and to continue the
education and raising of the child in his religion or creed, if any."
156. La. R.S. 9:387 (Supp. 1994):
Acts 1993, No. 261 does not apply to actions for separation from bed and board or
divorce or actions for incidental relief commenced before January 1, 1994, or to
reconventional demands thereto, whenever filed. Such actions are to be governed by the
law in effect prior to January 1, 1994.
157. Id.
158. La. Civ. Code art. 227 provides: "Fathers and mothers, by the very act of marrying,
contract. together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and educating their children."
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duty on mothers and fathers to support, maintain, and educate their children.
This was an obligation which arose from the "very act of marrying." Louisiana
Civil Code article 230'59 defines the scope of the obligation, Louisiana Civil
Code article 23 1'60 quantifies the obligation, Louisiana Civil Code article
2326 states the circumstances under which the obligation can be terminated
or reduced, and Louisiana Civil Code articles 233 and 234'62 provide an
alternate means of satisfying the obligation. The joint custody statute restated
the factors in Louisiana Civil Code article 231 and provided that each parent
shall be responsible for child support based on the needs of the child and the
actual resources of each parent.1 63 In 1989, Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:315
was enacted,'6 containing extensive guidelines and other statutory provisions
mandating the use of detailed rules in proceedings to establish or modify child
support. In the interim, the jurisprudence developed a set of principles 63 to
be used in quantifying the child support obligation. Act 261 essentially codifies
these jurisprudential principles and makes some important procedural changes in
child support proceedings.
The act grants explicit authority for a court to order child support in a
proceeding for divorce or thereafter,66 an authority implied in the substantive
159. La. Civ. Code art. 230 provides:
A. By alimony we understand what is necessary for the nourishment, lodging, and
support of the person who claims it.
B. It includes the education, when the person to whom the alimony is due is a minor, or
when the person to whom alimony is due is a major who is a full-time student in good
standing in a secondary school, has not attained the age of nineteen, and is dependent
upon either parent.
160. La. Civ. Code art. 231 provides: "Alimony shall be granted in proportion to the wants of
the person requiring it, and the circumstances of those who are to pay it."
161. La. Civ. Code art. 232 provides:
When the person who gives or receives alimony is replaced in such a situation that the
one can no longer give, or that the other is no longer in need of it, in whole or in part,
the discharge from or reduction of the alimony may be sued for and granted.
162. La. Civ. Code art. 233 provides: "If the person, whose duty it is to furnish alimony, shall
prove that he is unable to pay the same, the judge may, after examining into the case, order that such
person shall receive in his house, and there support and maintain the person to whom he owes
alimony."
La. Civ. Code art. 234 provides: "The judgq shall pronounce likewise whether the father or mother
who may offer to receive, support and maintain the child, to whom he or she may owe alimony, in
his or her house, shall be dispensed in that case from the obligation of paying for it elsewhere."
163. Former La. Civ. Code art. 146(A)(l)(c)(i) (1870), redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 131
by 1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8, and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10, provided: "Each parent shall
be responsible for child support based on the needs of the child and the actual resources of each
parent."
164. 1989 La. Acts No. 9 (2d Ex. Sess.).
165. These principles are reviewed in detail in La. Civ. Code art. 141 cmts. (b)-(f).
166. La. Civ. Code art. 141 provides:
In a proceeding for divorce or thereafter, the court may order either or both of the
parents to provide an interim allowance or final support for a child based on the needs of
the child and the ability of the parents to provide support.
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child support provisions and one which was universally assumed. 67 It
provides that the obligation is based on the needs of the child and the ability of
the parents to provide support. 68  No change is made in the circumstances
under which an award of child support may be modified or terminated. 69 It
also continues the statutory suspension or modification of the child support
obligation if one custodial parent or his agent is intentionally secreting the child
with the intent to preclude the other custodial parent from knowing the
whereabouts of the child sufficiently to permit a custodial parent from exercising
his rights or duties as joint custodial parent. 70 For the suspension or modifica-
tion of the obligation to occur, the obligor parent must obtain a court order
suspending or modifying his obligation.' If he does not, the obligation is not
suspended or modified during the period a parent is secreting the child.' The
provision is not self-operative. Secreting the child does not operate to suspend
or modify the obligation; only a court order entered because the parent is
secreting the child suspends or modifies the support obligation. Therefore,
secreting the child cannot be urged as a defense to a contempt action or action
to enforce past due child support absent a prior order suspending or modifying
the obligation. This act applies only in the case of a joint custody award;'7 3
it is inapplicable to parental sole custody or third party custodial awards.
Present Louisiana Civil Code article 14174 contains two procedural
changes. First, it authorizes the court to order either or both of the parents to
provide child support. In addition to the traditional award to the domiciliary
parent of a periodic monetary award of child support, the court may order either
or both parents to pay specified expenses of the child, such as school tuition,
group medical insurance premiums, certain travel expenses, and orthodontia
The court may award an interim allowance only when a demand for final support is
pending.
167. La. Civ. Code art. 141 cmi (a).
168. La. Civ. Code art. 141. See supra note 166 for the text of Article 141. This general
principle is subject to the detailed rules of La. R.S. 9:315-315:23 (1991 & Supp. 1994), the child
support guidelines statute.
169. La. Civ. Code art. 142 provides: "An award of child support may be modified if the
circumstances of the child or of either parent change and shall be terminated upon proof that it has
become unnecessary."
170. La. R.S. 9:315.23 (Supp. 1994), previously La. R.S. 9:314 (1992), provides:
If one joint custodial parent or his agent is intentionally secreting a child with the intent
to preclude the other joint custodial parent from knowing the whereabouts of the child
sufficiently to allow him to exercise his rights or duties as joint custodial parent, the latter
may obtain from the court an order suspending or modifying his obligation under an order
or judgment of child support. However, such circumstances shall not constitute a defense
to an action for failure to pay court-ordered child support or an action to enforce past due
child support.
.171. d
172. La. R.S. 9:315.23 (Supp. 1994).
173. Id.
174. See supra note 166 for the text of La. Civ. Code art. 141.
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expenses.' The court may also make a similar order in sole parental custody
or third party custody awards. In the latter, both parents may be ordered to pay
the third party custodian child support or to pay directly specified expenses of
the child. The authority of the court to order certain third party payments by the
obligor parent is contained in Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:315.8(D). 7 6 The
new article expands the types of payments to third parties that may be ordered.
Second, the article provides both for an interim allowance and for final
support for a child. 77  Frequently, a rule nisi for child support does not get
heard on its return date due to a crowded court docket, the need for discovery,
scheduling conflicts, or other reasons. This article gives the court authority to
enter an interim order for child support pending the hearing on the final order for
child support. This practice is already followed by some courts and is impliedly
authorized by Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:315.1(C)(5). 77 Louisiana Civil
Code article 141 now provides express authorization for an interim allowance of
child support. If this authority is utilized in making an interim award,
compliance with Louisiana Revised Statues 9:315.2(A) 79 should be ordered,
insofar as it is practicable for the parties to do so under the circumstances. This
way, the record will reflect some objective basis for the interim allowance for
appellate review purposes.
175. The article also provides authorization for a court to order the domiciliary parent to pay
child support to the nondomiciliary parent in appropriate circumstances, such as an implementation
plan that provides for equal physical custody of the child or extended periods of physical custody
granted to the nondomiciliary parent. See Montet v. Montet, 629 So. 2d 538 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993).
and the cases discussed therein for the judicial resolution of this issue under prior law.
176. La. R.S. 9:315.8(D) (1991) provides:
The party without legal custody or nondomiciliary party shall owe his or her total child
support obligation as a money judgment of child support to the custodial or domiciliary
party, minus any court-ordered direct payments made gn behalf of the child for work-
related net child care costs, health insurance premiums, extraordinary medical expenses,
or extraordinary expenses provided as adjustments to the schedule.
177. See supra note 166 for the text of La. Civ. Code art. 141.
178. La. R.S. 9:315.1(C) (1991) provides, in part:
In determining whether to deviate from the guidelines, the court's considerations may
include:
(5) The need for immediate and temporarl support for a child when a full hearing on the
issue of support is pending but cannot be timely held. In such cases, the court at the full
hearing shall use the provisions of this part and may redetermine support without the
necessity of a change of circumstances being shown.
179. La. R.S. 9:315.2(A) (1991) provides:
Each party shall provide to the court a verified income statement showing gross income
and adjusted gross income, together with documentation of current and past earnings.
Suitable documentation of current earnings shall include but not be limited to pay stubs,
employer statements, or receipts and expenses if self-employed. The documentation shall
include a copy of the party's most recent federal tax return. A copy of the statement and
documentation shall be provided to the other party.
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The article permits an interim allowance only when a demand for final
support is pending.I" This prevents a party from receiving a favorable interim
award based upon incomplete data without the pendency of a proceeding in
which all information and documentation may be obtained and final child support
determined after a full hearing.
The rules concerning the retroactivity of interim and final child support
judgments are carefully crafted to insure a good mesh between the two types of
awards."' Except for good cause shown, a judgment awarding, modifying, or
revoking an interim child support allowance is retroactive to the date of judicial
demand. A judgment that initially awards or denies final child support is
effective as of the date the judgment is signed, and the judgment terminates an
interim child support allowance as of that date. However, if an interim child
support allowance is not in effect on the date of the judgment awarding final
child support, the judgment of final child support is retroactive to date of judicial
demand, except for good cause shown. In all cases, the obligor is given credit
for child support of any kind paid to or on behalf of the child from the date of
judicial demand to the date the support judgment is signed, except for child
support paid pursuant to an interim child support judgment. This credit provision
applies both to interim child support allowance awards and awards of final child
support. If the court finds good cause for not making either award retroactive
to date of judicial demand, the court may fix the date on which the award shall
commence. Except for good cause shown, a judgment modifying or revoking a
final child support award is retroactive to the date of judicial demand.
180. La. Civ. Code art. 141.
181. La. R.S. 9:315.21 (Supp. 1994) provides:
A. Except for good cause shown, a judgment awarding, modifying, or revoking an
interim child support allowance shall be retroactive to the date of judicial demand.
B. (1) A judgment that initially awards or denies final child support is effective as of
the date the judgment is signed and terminates an interim child support allowance as of
that date.
(2) If an interim child support allowance award is not in effect on the date of the
judgment awarding final child support, the judgment shall be retroactive to the date of
judicial demand, except for good cause shown.
C. Except for good cause shown, a judgment modifying or revoking a final child support
judgment shall be retroactive to the date of judicial demand.
D. Child support of any kind, except that paid pursuant to an interim child support
allowance award, provided by the judgment debtor from the date of judicial demand to
the date the support judgment is signed, to or on behalf of the child for whom support is
ordered, shall be credited to the judgment debtor against the amount of the judgment.
E. In the event that the court finds good cause for not making the award retroactive to
the date of judicial demand, the court may fix the date on which the award shall
commence.
La. R.S. 9:310 (1991 & Supp. 1994), formerly regulating the retroactivity of child support and
alimony orders, was amended to substitute "spousal support" for "child support and alimony" in the
section heading and in subsection (A). Therefore, La. R.S. 9:310 applies only to spousal support
orders and La. R.S. 9:315.21 applies only to child support orders.
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Also continued is the provision for awarding, in joint custody decrees or
implementation orders, a portion of the housing expenses of a parent as child
support, even for a period when the child is not residing in the home of that
parent, if that parent would otherwise be unable to maintain adequate housing for
the child. 8 2 Comment (c) to Louisiana Civil Code article 141 suggests that,
under this provision, a court may, in or in conjunction with a joint implementa-
tion order, make a special monetary award to one spouse to enable that spouse
to maintain adequate housing for a child. It is not clear how this provision
interacts with the Louisiana Child Support Guidelines. Presumably, housing
expense is included in the guideline amounts. But Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:315.8(E)'83 provides, in calculating the child support obligation by the use of
worksheets, that in the case of joint custody the court shall consider the period
of time spent by the child with the nondomiciliary party as a basis for adjustment
to the amount of child support'to be paid during that period of time and shall
consider the continuing expenses of the domiciliary parent during that period of
time.
The provisions of former Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:309, regulating the
termination of child support upon the child's attaining the age of majority, have
been retained; except that the same rules are made applicable to the emancipation
of the child, thereby relieving the child of the disabilities attached to minority.
8 4
182. La. R.S. 9:337(A) (Supp. 1994) provides:
A joint custody decree or implementation order may include in the sum awarded for child
support a portion of the housing expenses of a parent even for a period when the child
is not residing in the home of that parent, if that parent would otherwise be unable to
maintain adequate housing for the child.
This provision is in the section of Title 9 of the Revised Statutes regulating Child Custody, as a
provision that may be contained in a joint custody decree or implementation order.
183. La. R.S. 9:315.8(E) (1991):
In cases of joint custody, the court shall consider the period of time spent by the child
with the nondomiciliary party as a basis for adjustment to the amount of child support to
be paid during that period of time. The court shall include in such consideration the
continuing expenses of the domiciliary party.
184. La. R.S. 9:315.22 (Supp. 1994) provides:
A. When there is a child support award in a specific amount per child, the award for each
child shall terminate automatically without any action by the obligor upon each child's
attaining the age of majority, or upon emancipation relieving the child of the disabilities
attached to minority.
B. When there is a child support award in globo for two or more children, the award
shall terminate automatically and without any action by the obligor when the youngest
child for whose benefit the award was made attains the age of majority or is emancipated
relieving the child of the disabilities attached to minority.
C. An award of child support continues with respect to any unmarried child who attains
the age of majority, or to a child who is emancipated relieving the child of the disabilities
attached to minority, as long as the child is a full-time student in good standing in a
secondary school, has not attained the age of nineteen, and is dependent upon either
parent. Either the primary domiciliary parent or the major or emancipated child is the
proper party to enforce an award of child support pursuant to this Subsection.
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As originally enacted by Act 311 of 1981, Louisiana Revised Statutes
9:309(C) provided:
An order or judgment of child support may continue with respect to any
unmarried child who attains the age of majority as long as the child is
a full-time student in a secondary school, has not attained the age of
nineteen, and is dependent upon either parent. The major child shall be
the proper party to enforce an order or judgment of child support which
is continued beyond the age of majority pursuant to this Subsection.
Savage v. Savage"5 interpreted these provisions as contemplating that a
separate judicial action to continue child support beyond the child's attaining the
age of majority should be brought on behalf of the unmarried minor child prior
to the automatic termination of the child support at the child's majority in order
to determine the child's eligibility for continued child support. If the child
support was continued, the major child was the proper party to enforce the order
or judgment continuing the child support. Absent such an action and judgment,
the child support automatically terminated by operation of law upon the child
attaining the age of majority.
Act 1014 of 1992 amended subsection (C) to provide that an order or
judgment of child support "shall continue" in the specified circumstances and
that "[e]ither the primary domiciliary parent or the major child" shall be the
proper party to enforce such an order or judgment.
Thus, it was no longer necessary to institute a separate judicial proceeding
to determine the child's eligibility for continued child support, and either the
primary domiciliary parent or the major child could enforce the original order or
judgment of child support upon the child's attaining the age of majority.
The latest revision"8 provides that the order or judgment "continues." It
includes a child who is emancipated, relieving the child of the disabilities
attached to minority, and it adds the emancipated child as a proper party to
enforce an award of child support pursuant to this subsection.
The transitional provision of Act 261 makes the new child support provisions
inapplicable to separation from bed and board and divorce actions and actions
for incidental relief commenced before January 1, 1994 or to reconventional
demands to these actions, whenever filed. These actions and reconventional
demands are governed by the law in effect prior to January 1, 1994."87
185. 589 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
186. Designated as La. R.S. 9:315.22(C) (Supp. 1994) by 1993 La. Acts No. 261, § 7.
187. La. R.S. 9:387 (Supp. 1994) provides:
Acts 1993, No. 261 does not apply to actions for separation from bed and board or
divorce or actions for incidental relief commenced before January 1, 1994, or to
reconventional demands thereto, whenever filed. Such actions are to be governed by the
law in effect prior to January 1, 1994.
i
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IV. CONCLUSION
This revision of the child custody and child support provisions represents a
much needed reform, especially in custody proceedings. The revision should
simplify and expedite custody and child support determinations. If the spousal
support proposal is adopted by the Legislature, it will complete the enormous
task undertaken by the Persons Committee in eight facets of family law which
affect nearly all Louisiana citizens.
